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This article was excerpted and 
abridged with permission from a 
chapter in Professor White's recent book 
Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in 
Literature, Law, and Politics. In the 
book, he explores the nature of 
authority in veriow cultural contexts. 
Here he examines theJoint Opinion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which 
has been been attacked bothfrom the 
right, on the grounds that it tried to 
keep Roe v. Wade alive, andfrom the 
left, on the grounds that it signqicantly 
weakens the force of that case. Professor 
White, by contrast, admires it greatly, 
and in this chapter explains why. 
01994 by the University of Chicago. 
All nghts reserved. Reprinted with permission. 
When the Supreme Court faces a 
precedent it disagrees with, the authority 
of the past becomes a real issue for us, 
not merely a theoretical one, for we must 
repeatedly ask to what weight the earlier 
decision is entitled. Is the present Court 
bound by a prior case, even if it thinks 
the judgment wrong or undesirable? 
Or is the prior case to be read simply as 
advisory: Here is what some people have 
thought, after putting their minds to the 
question; you should take it seriously so 
far as you respect the quality of their 
work, but no more seriously than any 
other thought on the subject by, say, a 
professor or journalist or a politician? 
On this view, precedent would simply be 
another source of information about ways 
to think about the case. Or is there a 
different view? 
I want to explore this matter in 
connection with the abortion issue, 
which raises it in a stark and public form. 
One way to put the question is by asking 
whether Roe v. Wade,  the 1973 case 
establishing a woman's constitutional 
right to decide whether to continue a 
pregnancy, should be regarded as 
authoritative and hence binding on the 
present Court, which, as I write in 1992, 
has a large majority that apparently 
would have voted the other way in Roe. 
It is not simply that these justices 
disapprove of abortion as a moral matter; 
they believe that Roe represented a 
serious misreading of the Constitution. 
What attitude should they then have 
towards Roe v. Wade? One cannot really 
begin to think about this question 
without thinking about the cases that 
precede Roe, with an eye both to their 
meaning and to their authority. 
PRIOR LAW 
As the Constitution was onginally 
adopted, virtually no argument could 
have been made that it  prohibited the 
states from adopting "anti-abortion" 
laws The reason is that, w t h  the excep- 
tion of a small number of provlslons in 
Articles I and IV, the Constitution did 
not limlt the power of a state over ILS 
1 
citEens at all It was pnmarily meant to 
i 
allocate governmental power among I 
the three branches of the national 
I 
government and between the national 
government on the one hand and the 
states on the other The Bill of fights, 
adopted in 179 1, did not change this as . 
far as the states were concerned, for its 
provisions and protections were limita- 
tions only on the federal government. 
The states were free to violate them as 
much as they wished, as indeed was 
necessary if some of them were to 
maintain the institition of human slavery. 
Only after the Civil War was the 
Constitution amended to regulate the 
relation between the citizen and the state. 
The method chosen was not, however, 
simply to apply the Bill of Rights to the 
states; rather, the new amendments 
focused on the rights of the newly freed 
slaves and other African Americans. 
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited 
slavery; the Fifteenth provided that the 
vote should not be withheld on the 
grounds of race; the Fourteenth, for our 
purposes the most important one, spoke 
in more general language, providing that 
no state should deprive any person of 
"life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law" or deny any person 
"equal protection of the laws." What is 
this lanpage to mean? In answering this 
question, the Supreme Court created a 
jurisprudence deeply affecting many 
aspects of the relation between the citizen 
and the state. 
LOCHNER 
At first, this jurisprudence was 
fashioned by a conservative Court, hostile 
to social legislation and in particular to 
state laws regulating the economy. In a 
case that has become symbolic of the era, 
Lochner v. New York (1905), it struck 
down New York laws that prohibited 
bakers from working more than ten 
hours a day or sixty hours a week, on the 
grounds that this was an impermissible 
interference with liberty of the workmen 
to contract for their labor. Other welfare 
laws were invalidated for similar reasons. 
The idea of "due process" that these laws 
were held to violate was substantive, not 
merely procedural: however correct its 
processes of lawmaking, the state could 
not interfere with an economy working 
by the principles of the market without a 
clear need articulated on recognized 
grounds. 
This position of the Court, of course, 
was gradually overturned. The legislative 
program of the New Deal was based on 
very different premises: that our 
economy and society were partly made 
by human beings, that they were prop- 
erly subject to reform and transforma- 
tion, and t h a ~  the health of the economy 
required a prosperous working class to 
serve as its customers. Through changes 
of mind and personnel, the Court came 
to support legslation based on these 
views, at the state and national levels 
alike. 
In the process, the authority of Loclznel- 
and its kin was thoroughly repudiated, 
the Court insisting that these decisions 
represented an inappropriate form of 
judicial legislation, involving the imposi- 
tion of partisan political or economic 
values on the legslatures to whom our 
democratic system assigned authority for 
resolving those questions. The Court's 
task, it was said, was not to impose its 
view of the economy or society but to 
confine itself to interpreting the limita- 
tions found in the Constitution. 
OLMSTEAD AND 
GRISWOLD 
During the 1920s, while the conserva- 
tives were still in power, the Court 
decided a case of enormous significance 
for the future developnlent of the law 
relating to abortion, though at first glance 
it would seem to have a wholly different 
subject. This case, Olmstend v. United 
States (1927), held that wiretapping by 
federal officials was not a "search within 
the meaning of that word in the Fourth 
IT IS NOT 
SIMPLY THE PAST 
THAT DECIDES. 
Amendment, defining the term, as 
though it were obvious, in terms of a 
physical invasion or trespass.' The main 
significance of the case lay not in its 
holding, however, but in the dissents of 
Holmes and Brandeis, especially the 
latter, who thought the majority's view 
unduly narrow and technical. 
Brandeis believed that the Constitution 
should be regarded not simply as a set of 
commands to be read in an unimagna- 
tive and literal way, but as a text meant to 
govern our polity for generations; its 
language should be read not restrictively 
but generously, whether one speaks of 
grants of power to legislatures or of 
definitions of the rights of citizens. 
A particular provision, such as the 
regulation of "searches," should accord- 
ingly be read not only in light of the 
particular lunds of abuse with which the 
framers were familiar, and which ani- 
mated the provision in the first place, but 
in light of principles defining the abuse in 
its more general form. For Brandeis the 
basic principle of the amendment was the 
protection of privacy. It was adopted not 
to protect property, but to protect the 
right of people to be let alone. When that 
right is violated as effectively by technol- 
ogy unknown to the framers as it would 
be by a physical search, it should be held 
within the constitutional p r~h ib i t i on .~  
In the 1950s and after, the Court 
became activist once more, but in quite a 
different way from the Lochner Court. 
Again the "due process" and "equal 
protection" language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was read expansively, but 
this time mainly to protect not economic 
rights but civil rights and liberties. To a 
' For an exiended discussion of this case, see my 
Jristice as TI-anslation: An Essay in Cultural and 
Legal CI-it~cism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), chapter 6. 
For a proposed analysis of this case that is 
neither so literal minded as  the majority nor so 
expansive as Brandeis, see Clark Cunningham, 
"A Linguistic Analysis of 'Search' in the Fourth 
amend men^: A Search for Common Sense," 
73 Iowa Law Review 541 (1988). 
large extent the provisions of the Bill of 
kghts  were read into the due process 
clause, or considered "incorporated" in it, 
especially those that protected the 
freedom of press and religion and those 
that governed the rights of those sus- 
pected of crime. The most important 
single case was Brown v. Board of Educn- 
tion (1954), holding state-enforced racial 
segregation in public schools to be a 
violation of the equal protection clause. 
Much of this was opposed as shocking 
judicial activism, the conversion of 
neutral constitutional law into value- 
based politics, but often by those who 
would have supported Lochner, and 
defended, often in self righteous terms, 
by those who would have regarded 
Loclzner as a low point of judicial irre- 
sponsibility, indeed as a subversion of the 
constitutional process. Insofar as these 
two sides were defined by their affiliation 
with one Court or another, both of them 
were presented with the same problem: 
how to disapprove of Lochner without 
also disapproving of the Warren Court, 
or vice versa. 
Another of the crucial cases of this era, 
from the point of view of theory and 
consequence alike, was Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965), which held unconsti- 
tutional a Connecticut law prohibiting 
the use of birth control devices, even by 
married couples. This was obviously, to 
most of the Court, an undesirable, bad, 
even "silly" law - but how was it 
unconstitutional? Speaking for the 
majority, Justice Douglas explicitly 
refused to be guided by the analogy to 
Lochizer, a case he loathed, but instead 
looked to the Bill of kghts, most of 
which had by now been incorporated in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. None of 
these provisions, it is true, spoke of birth 
control or reproductive freedom, or of 
privacy, but many of them, taken 
together, could be seen to serve the 
fundamental value of human privacy. 
This is an extension of the kind of 
reading Brandeis gave the Fourth 
Amendment in Olmstend. To make up for 
the want of helpful language, Douglas 
spoke of "penumbras" formed by "ema- 
nations" from these provisions, for which 
he was widely ridiculed. 
Others, notably Justice Harlan, round 
in the due process clause itself an 
injunction to the Court to insist upon the 
protection of those rights that have been 
fundamental to our ~oc ie ty .~  To deter- 
mine these, it is not enough to look 
within the self, at one's own values; one 
must look without, at our history and 
culture. The Constitution chose to 
protect these rights under such vague 
language because in the nature of things 
they cannot be spelled out more pre- 
cisely. Their definition and elaboration is 
entrusted to the Court because the way 
the Court works -by the decision of 
particular cases, carefully argued on both 
sides; by the refusal to decide more than 
is actually before it; by the resulting 
particularity of the judgment, informed 
as it is by the ways in which conflicting 
values present themselves in real cases - 
entitles it to a trust and an authority that 
a more political or less disciplined branch 
of government would not deserve. 
Like Brandeis, Harlan rejected the idea 
that the Constitution should be regarded 
as simply speaking in plain English, 
saylng just what it means, and for much 
the same reason: that the Constitution is 
meant to serve the highest purposes of 
government and collective life and that 
these cannot be reduced to a code. 
Instead, the Court must accept responsi- 
bility for judgment, which for Harlan 
means a responsibility to educate itself at 
the hands of its own past. As Harlan sees 
it, the extraordinary duty and privilege ol 
the judge is to reconstitute this source of 
authority in his own prose. The line 
between self and world is in this way 
blurred, as the mind of the judge is partly 
made by the very material it transforms. 
But this was only his view. There were 
six judges in the majority in Gris~jold, 
each of them writing a separate opinion, 
on a different theoly, leaving the law, to 
say the least, unsettled. 
ROE 
Such, in extremely reduced outline, 
was the state ol affairs at the lime Roe v. 
Wade was decided in 1973. As everyone 
Iznows, this case held that a woman has 
the right to terminate her pregnancy 
during its early stages. But the opinion of 
the Court, written by Justice Blackmun, 
locused less on the nature of her right 
than on the nature of the interes~s that 
the state asserted as the ground for 
limiting it. In this, it was reminiscent of 
Lochner itself, for the idea of both is that 
state interference with individual free- 
doms is invalid unless based on good 
reasons (expressed in terms of public 
health, safety, and morals in Lochner, and 
of, legitimate, substantial, or compelling 
state interests in Roe). 
In Roe the Court held that during the 
first trimester, before the fetus quick- 
ened, the decision about abortion was 
solely for the woman and her doctor. 
After that the state had a sufficient 
interest to justify regulation to protect the 
woman's health, for now abortion 
presented greater dangers to the woman 
than childbirth did. In the third trimes- 
ter, when the fetus became indepen- 
dently viable, the state could act to 
prolect that future human life by prohib- 
iting abortion, except in the case of 
danger to the woman's life or health. 
This opinion was widely criticized, 
not only by those who simply opposed 
abortion but on institutional grounds. 
Roe was felt by many to be an unwar- 
ranted interference with the rights of the 
people of the slates to decide such 
questions for themselves through the 
political process. While the Court can 
invalidate state legislation that is incon- 
sistent with the Constitution, here there 
is no constitutional language justifying 
such action - nothing about "abortion" 
or "privacy" - and no earlier precedent 
supporting it, except maybe G~iswold, 
which was felt to be an unwarranted 
piece of judicial activism, and one or two 
cases building upon it. Nor is Roe 
supported by the prior practice of the 
states, which was nearly uniformly to 
regard abortion as subject to their 
prohibition or regulation, at least in 
recent decades. 
Finally - for some most importantly 
- the form of the opinion was legislative 
rather than judicial. It consisted not of 
the decision of a particular case under 
general constitutional standards, but the 
decision of an abstract issue by the 
articulation of a regulatory code of the 
sort we normally associate with legisla- 
tion. Whatever the Constitution may be 
thought to say about the principles of 
privacy or reproductive rights, it is 
ludicrous to think that it speaks in terms 
of trimesters. To make rules of this sort, 
the argument goes, is peculiarly the task 
of the legislature, because by their nature 
such rules work as approximations that 
rest on estimates of factual probability 
which the legislature is in a far better 
position than the judiciary to make. My 
own judgment at the time, for what it is 
worth, was that the Court was wrong as a 
matter of constitutional law, though on 
the underlying moral issue of abortion I 
was unsure what was right. 
More can of course be said about Roe, 
but for our purposes this is enough to 
suggest that the situation of the Court in 
1992, faced with a challenge to that case, 
was a complex and difficult one. Roc 
established both a general principle, that 
the right to control reproduction lay 
within the right to privacy, and a set of 
quasi-legislative rules, which may be 
entitled to significantly less authority 
than its central holding. And the status of 
the principle itself can be questioned, to 
say the least: the case was contro~~ersial 
when it was decided, on institutional as 
well as substantive grounds; it depended 
on Gliswold, itself a case that many 
people felt to be wrong in principle and 
method alike. To what, then, should 
authority be given in deciding Casey, 
and why? 
CASEY 
On both substantive and procedural 
grounds, Roe has been controversial from 
the day it was decided. It was the object 
of excoriation by the Republican party in 
particular, with both Presidents Reagan 
and Bush seeking to appoint justices who 
would overrule it. Of those on the Roe 
Court only Blackmun, who wrote the 
opinion, and White and Rehnquist, who 
dissented, were left on the Court at the 
time of Casey. All but White had been 
appointed by Republican presidents, four 
of them by Reagan or Bush. In a series of 
inconclusive cases, the Court had 
avoided either reaffirming or overruling 
Roe, though Rehnquist and Scalia 
repeatedly called for its rejection.' Casey 
presented the issue of Roe's continued 
vitality not so much because its facts 
required the judgment as because the 
recent appointment of Clarence Thomas 
was thought to give the overrulers the 
majority they needed. It was widely 
believed that the Court would face and 
resolve it, but no one could confidently 
predict how the Court would vote, 
largely because it was uncertain what 
Justices O'Connor and Souter would do. 
The legislature in Cnsey did not 
attempt to prohibit abortion entirely but 
instead regulated it, with a series of 
requirements: that the doctor give the 
woman certain information about 
abortion itself and about the availability 
of adoption agencies and others who 
would support a decision to carry the 
His views are best expressed m his famous 
opinion in an earlier stase or the Gnswold case, 
Poc v. Ullman (1961). 
See, [or example, \Vcbstti. v. Rcproductlve Health 
Sc i~~ices ,  492 U. S. 490 (1989); T h o ~ n b u ~ ~ g l ~  V. 
Anlelicnn Coliegr cfObstct17cii7i1~ C G~nciologLsts, 
476 U. S. 747 (1956); Aki-on v. A ~ I - o n  Cer~tcrjol-  
Rrl)roduclive Hcalth, 462 U. S. 416 11983); hlclbsi- 
\I. Roe,432 U S .  464 (1977); Planned Pni-enthood 
ojCentrz11 Mo v. Dnnjorth, 428 U 5. 52 (1976); 
Doc 1,. Bolton, 410 U 5. 179 (1973). 
fetus to term; that minors obtain the 
consent of their parents, except in certain 
cases: that a woman wait twenty-four 
hours after first coming to the clinic or 
hospital before actually having the 
abortion; and that a married woman 
inform her husband of her plans to have 
an abortion. It would have been possible 
to determine the validity of the regula- 
tions, especially in their favor, without 
addressing the underlying issue, whether 
ROE was still good law. But no one on the 
Court favored that; all wanted to face the 
central question. 
There are two relatively easy ways to 
think about it: that Roc was right and 
therefore still is the law, and that it was 
wrong, and therefore is not. Justice 
Blackmun, and to some degree Stevens, 
adopted the first approach, while Justices 
Scalia and Rehnquist, with Thomas and 
White voting with them, took the 
second. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and 
Souter wrote an opinion that takes a 
different approach, and one that is 
remarkable in several respects. It was 
jointly written and siLgned, a rare event in 
the history of the Court.' I t  was largely 
written, I think, by the justices them- 
selves and not by their clerks. It  was 
without a single footnote. Most impor- 
tant, it addressed not just the "rightness" 
or "wrongness" of Roe abstractly consid- 
ered, but the kind of weight and respect 
it should be accorded under the doctrine 
of stare decisis, even by those who 
disagree with it. 
This happened also in Cooper 11. Aaron, 358 U.S. 
1 ( 1 958) and Rcgents of the Uni\~crsit~r of Cal~ fo~n ia  
11. Bahhe, 438 U.S. 265 (19781. 
THE AUTHORITY 
OF THE PAST 
In Casey the Court reaffirms what it 
calls the "essential holding" of Roe - that 
prior to viability it is the woman alone 
who should decide whether to terminate 
the pregnancy. Other parts of the holding 
viewed as less essential are discarded: the 
idea that the state has no interest at all in 
protecting the future of a fetus before 
quickening, for example, and the rigd 
trimester structure. Rather, for the 
authors of the Joint Opinion, the critical 
line is viability: prior to that point the 
state may regulate abortion, but it may 
not take away the woman's right to 
choose nor may it subject that choice to 
"undue burdens." In this way they 
right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child." Eisenstadt v. Bczird, 405 U. S. 
438, at 453 [emphasis in original]. 
Our precedents "have respected the 
private realm of family life which the 
state cannot enter." Princc 11. Mnssachu- 
setts, 321 U. 5. 158, 166 (1944). These 
matters, involving the most intimate 
and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart 
of liberty is the right to define one's 
own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State. 
This is idealistic language, and it 
esposes its authors to the contempt of 
those who cannot stand that way of 
talking. However, it catches an essential 
reaffirm the central core of Roe. But they 
do so less because they personally agree 
with Roe as an original proposition than 
because they believe that respect for the 
Court's own past requires it. 
In this they are not simply knuckling 
under to what they regard as an unavoid- 
able command, as cogs in an authoritar- 
ian intellectual machine, but acting out 
of a complex conception both of this case 
and of the Court, which they strive in 
this opinion to make real and compre- 
hensible to their audience. This is not a 
, reluctant or joyless opinion; its writers 
find in their understanding of their role 
, and situation under our Constitution a 
way of thinking and talking about this 
issue that, in my view at least, dignifies 
both it and them. Indeed, it is partly 
because they would not originally have 
' voted for Roc that the conception they 
have both of themselves and of that case, 
' 
which leads them to affirm it ,  has such 
force and gravity. 
To start with the merits of Roe, the 
authors describe this case in a way that 
a does not commit them to the view that, 
taking everything into account, it was 
"right" when decided; rather, they 
explain why, on the merits, the case is 
! entitled to a high degree of respect. They 
I 
define Roe, that is, not as an unjustified 
or bizarre decision which they might be 
entitled to disregard, but as an important 
effort by the Court to speak to a crucial 
issue that is entitled to real respect - 
certainly not desening the derisory 
sneers of the chief justice and of Justice 
Scalia. Here is what they say: 
Our law affords constitutional 
protection to personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education. Gal-cy tr. 
Population Set-vices International, 43 1 
U. S., at 685. Our cases recognize "the 
point: that for the state to prohibit 
abortion is to take a position on an 
essentially religious topic, the nature of 
human life, which it is the aim of our 
Constitution to leave in private hands. 
Not that an anti-abortion law is a full- 
fledged establishment of religion in 
violation of the First Amendment, but it 
has overtones of that kind, for its effect is 
to preclude an individual woman from 
addressing this essentially religous issue 
on her own. The effect of this in turn is 
to dwarf or limit her capacity for matura- 
tion and responsibility as a full human 
being. On this view, it is natural to see 
the issue as the Court frames it, not in 
terms of a specific right to abortion but as 
an aspect of the "liberty" explicitly 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The point of liberty, so conceived, is not 
simply freedom from constraint, but the 
creation of conditions in which the 
possibilities for human life can be most 
fully achieved. 
To conceive of what a legislature 
intrudes upon when it prohibits abortion 
not as a "right" but as an aspect of 
"liberty" not only ties the holding more 
firmly to the language of the Constitu- 
tion, but it connects its two aspects, the 
affirmance of Roe on the merits and the 
institutional obligation to protect the 
liberties defined by the Constitution, in a 
consistent and coherent way. As the first 
sentence of the opinion, in a sense 
organizing the whole, puts it: "Liberty 
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of 
doubt." This sentence calls on the Court 
to determine whether liberty includes a 
woman's right to make her own decisions 
with respect to abortion, not in the 
abstract, as if the issue were wholly new, 
but in light of their obligation as a Court 
to presei-ve the liberties established by 
prior decisions. 
This in turn calls for a process of 
"reasoned judgment," a phrase that the 
Court will define for us in the rest of 
what it says. What it tells us now, in the 
first sentence, is that it will not proceed 
in the quasiscientific manner that 
characterizes so much legal analysis, as 
though the issues before it could be 
separated into wholly discrete entities, 
but with the acknowledgment that for 
them the judgment on Roe is necessarily 
at the same time a judgment about the 
authority of the past. These issues are 
interdependent; the Court thus estab- 
lishes a mode of proceeding that is 
comprehensive and integrative in charac- 
ter, rather than linear and abstract. 
THE COURT TURNS ITS MIND 
TO THE WAY CITIZENS RESPOND 
TO ITS DECISIONS, ESPECIALLY 
T O  THOSE THEY DISAGREE WITH. 
LIBERTY 
For the writers of the Joint Opinion, 
the central modem text is not the 
majority opinion in Grisvvold, upon which 
Roe is usually thought to depend, but 
Harlan's earlier opinion in Poe v. Ullman 
(1961), in which he urged that the Court 
strike down the same Connecticut 
statute. This opinion is perhaps the 
classic definition of a certain view of "due 
process": Harlan refused to reduce it to a 
code or to specific rules or practices of 
the past - for the essence of liberty 
cannot be protected that way -yet at 
the same time refused to see it simply as 
the imposition of contemporary or 
evolving political values. The task of the 
judge, as Harlan defined it, is to engage 
with the traditions of the law and of our 
country in a responsive and responsible 
way; to defer in all reasonable ways to the 
judgments of others; to educate, and thus 
transform, his own mind by full consid- 
eration of what others have said and 
done; and, in a case which calls for it, to 
make his judgment whether the state has 
interfered with a liberty defined by that 
tradition. He sees that an essential part of 
the tradition lies in its principles of self- 
transformation. Conservation requires 
change. 
The very fact that the power the 
Constitution has given the Court cannot 
be reduced to rules, but rests on prin- 
ciples and understandings necessarily 
broad and indeterminate, means that 
great restraint is essential to its exercise 
and continued existence. Such power will 
be tolerated in unelected officials only 
when used sparingly and well. Likewise, 
the act of judgment must be reasoned, 
and in this sense justify itself: it is not 
simply the past that decides, as if you 
could take any modem issue and see how 
others dealt with it, nor simply the 
present, as if the meaning of the case 
could adequately be cast in terms of 
contemporary political debate. The task 
of the judge is to educate himself, to 
modify his own sensibilities by engage- 
ment with our tradition, so that in the 
end it is neither he alone, nor the past 
alone, that decides, but he as formed and 
educated by engagement with the past. 
The Court's term for this is "reasoned 
judgment." The idea of tradition with 
which Justice Harlan works is not as a set 
of discrete decisions that are entitled to 
authority, but as a process of develop- 
ment and change, to which it is the 
judge's task to contribute in an intelligent 
and responsible way. In invoking the 
shade of Harlan as their guide, the 
writers of the Joint Opinion ask to be 
tested by his standards of intelligence, 
responsibility, and humility. What sort of 
education in the law, and our own 
traditions, does this text reflect? What 
sort of education does it offer its reader? 
They begin by describing the kind of 
"liberty" that the abortion laws invade, 
but in so doing they are careful not to 
speak as though it could be abstracted 
from the context in which they in fact 
face it - the context defined by the 
existence of Roe itself. It is not the case 
for them, as it is for more abstract 
thinkers, that legal questions should be 
decided as questions of theory, out of 
time and place as it were, but the oppo- 
site of that: the case before them cannot 
be separated into the "merits of Roe" and 
the "obligation to follow the law." Both 
aspects are before them, and they 
interact: "The reservations any of us may 
have in reaffirming the central holding of 
Roe are outweighed by the explication of 
individual liberty we have given com- 
bined with the force of stare decisis." This 
insistence upon the actual context and 
upon the interrelatedness of the decisions 
before them, like their earlier invocation 
of Justice Harlan at his greatest, enacts a 
kind of conservatism very different from 
radical dogmatism of our era. It is a 
cultural conservatism, of which an 
important element is the location of 
authority outside one's own dispositions, 
and outside one's own ratiocinations, in 
the culture, as this is reconstituted by an 
attentive mind. 
STARE DECISIS 
Their explicit discussion or stare 
dccisis, to which (hey next turn, proceeds 
lrom the double assumption that some 
obligaiion to follow ihe past is necessary 
both to the idea of law and to the 
legitimacy of the Court, yet thai the past 
cannot be followed slavishly. The Court 
thus explicitly resists the temptation to 
collapse a complicated inquiry into a 
slogan, but recognizes that the twin 
necessities they describe define a field for 
what they have called "reasoned judg- 
ment" which ihey will now undertake to 
exemplify. 
They begin their performance by 
looking to the other cases in which the 
Court has been faced with the issue of 
stare decisis. In considering the degree of 
authority to be given the past, that is, 
they proceed by first considering the past 
itself. What they claim to discover is that 
this judgment has been guided by several 
factors: whether the case in question has 
proved unworkable; whether its continu- 
ance is supported by reliance that would 
make its overruling especially burden- 
some or inequitable; whether doctrine in 
related fields has developed to such a 
degree t h a ~  the case in question is merely 
a "remnant" of an abandoned view; and 
whether the factual perceptions that 
supported the original decision have 
changed in such a way as to undermine 
il. Aslzing of Roe the questions these 
criteria suggest, they not unsurprisingly 
find that it has not proven unworkable, 
 hat doc~rine has not developed in such a 
way as to leave it behind - quite the 
reverse in fact - and that while the 
[actual context has changed owing to 
medical advances, it has done so in ways 
 ha^ affect only the trimester scheme of 
Roe, not its essential holding. 
With respect to reliance, their argu- 
ment is more complex, difficult, and 
important. First, they acknowledge that 
this is not a case in which people have 
advanced sums of money in reliance 
upon a rule of property or contract in 
such a way as to make it unfair to change 
it on them. But this should not exhaust 
the meaning of reliance: 
To eliminate the issue of reliance 
that easily, however, one would need 
to limit cognizable reliance to specific 
instances of sexual activity. But to do 
this would be simply to refuse to face 
the fact that for two decades of 
economic and social developments, 
people have organized intimate 
relationships and made choices that 
define their views of themselves and 
their places in society, in reliance on 
the availability of abortion in the event 
that contraception should fail. The 
ability of women to participate equally 
in the economic and social life of the 
Nation has been facilitated by their 
ability to control their repl-oductive 
lives. See, e.g., R. Petchesky, Abortion 
and Woman's Choice 109, 133, n. 7 
(rev. ed. 1990). The Constitution 
serves human values, and while the 
effect of reliance on Roe cannot be 
exactly measured, neither can the 
certain cost of overruling Roe for 
people who have ordered their 
thinking and living around that case 
be dismissed. 
This passage connects the issue of 
reliance, which bears on the issue of stare 
decisis, with a larger sense of the nature 
and importance of a judicial decision of 
this character. Such an opinion becomes 
a part of the culture, they say: it affects 
ihe ways in which people conceive of 
themselves and their possibilities for life. 
Insofar as it is not to be repudiated on 
one of the grounds suggested, this is a 
large and deep reason for its continu- 
a n ~ e . ~  In Burke's terms, the significant 
decisions of the Supreme Court help 
shape our "prejudices," the attitudes and 
feelings, the ways of imagining our world 
and affiliating ourselves with it, that 
makes us what we are. 
OVERRULINGS 
The Court could stop here, but it goes 
on to consider the two instances of 
overruling that cut most powerfully 
against what it has said: the rejection of 
Lochner in the 1930s and the repudiation 
of the "separate but equal" doctrine in 
Brown v. Board of Education. 
With respect to the Lochner tradition, 
the key case was West Coast Hotel v .  
Parish (1937), overruling Adhins v. 
Clzildren's Hospital of D. C. (1923), which 
had struck down a statute requiring 
employers to pay adult women a mini- 
mum wage. This case was properly 
overruled, the Court says, and on the 
grounds that do not reach Roe, for 
Adkins unlike Roe rested on "fundamen- 
tally false factual assumptions about the 
capacity of a relatix~ely unregulated 
market to satisfy minimum levels of 
human welfare." Even if one does not 
oneself believe these assumptions false, 
that does not blunt the force of the 
Court's point: to the overruling Court in 
West Coast Hotel the assumptions were 
plainly false in a way for which there is 
no analogue in Roe. 
Assimilating B P O I Y ~  to the model of 
West Coast Hotel, the Court in Casey 
focuses on language in Plessy v. Ferpson 
(1896) which denies, as a factual matter, 
that the mere separation of the races, in 
this case on trains, stamps one race with 
inferiority. Admitting that the justices 
may not in fact have believed this - 
How could they! - the Court says that it 
is nonetheless the "stated justification" 
for their opinion, and by the time of 
Brown this factual assumption was seen 
as plainly wrong. 
In a final section of its opinion, before 
reaching the particular provisions of the 
Pennsylvania statute before it, the Court 
expands on what it thinks is at stake in 
its decision: the legitimacy of the Court 
" Compare the famous remark of Brancleis in 
Oltnstcnd v. United Stales, 277 U.S. 438, 485 
(19271, that "the Govemn~ent is the potent. 
the omnipresent teacher." 
itself, and its capacity to perform its 
essential and unique role in our democ- 
racy. To discharge its responsibilities and 
maintain its position, the Court must 
seelz to decide cases on the ground of 
principle, or what it earlier called 
"reasoned judgment." "The Court must 
take care to speak and act in ways that 
allow people to accept its decisions on 
the terms the Court claims for them, as 
grounded truly in principle, not as 
compromises with social and political 
pressures having, as such, no bearing on 
the principled choices that the Court is 
obliged to make." Essential to this goal is 
respect for the decisions of the past; 
frequent overruling of its own decisions 
would be a statement by the Court itself 
that they were not entitled to respect. 
Where, as here, the Court decides a 
matter intensely divisive ol our polity, it 
is especially important to respect the 
choices that have been made by the past. 
"Only the most convincing justifications" 
could demonstrate that an overruling in 
such a case was "anything but a surren- 
der to political pressure." Once the 
decision is made, it is essential to live 
with it unless it is plainly wrong. This is 
the point where the Court comes closest 
to acknowledging the existence of the 
enonnous forces at work in our country 
on abortion, making it a focus of opposi- 
tion that has some of the characteristics 
of a civil war itself. The extraordinary 
character of the issue makes principled 
judgment and adherence to prior author- 
ity all the more important. To reverse 
oneself under pressure will give the 
impression, perhaps correctly, that the 
Court is nothing but another vehicle for 
political life - and that (though they do 
not say this) the appointment of new 
justices can properly rest on purely 
political and result-oriented judgments 
rather than on qualities of mind and 
character traditionally thought essential 
to the judicial role. 
There follows now an extraordinary 
moment in the histoi-)~ of American law. 
The Court turns its mind to the way 
citizens respond to its decisions, espe- 
cially to those they disagree with. Of 
course it is easy to support the Court 
when it comes out your way, and of 
course many people who disagree 
respond with simple and continuing 
opposition or resistance. It is not with 
either of these groups that the Court 
concerns itself, but with those who , 
disagree with the result, yet "struggle to 
accept it, because they respect the rule of 
law." To them the Court must keep its 
promise; for if it does not, but reverses 
itself too easily, in the end "a price [.cvill] 
be paid for nothing." 
The Court does not explicate this 
point further, but what they mean, 
I think, is this: they are imagining the 
moral drama that occurs when a person 
is opposed to a law yet respects it, 
a drama in ordinary life that parallels the 
one they are experiencing as judges. This 
drama is seen as a painful but also as a 
good thing. It is good because only at 
such moments is the commitment to the 
rule of law a meaningful one: when you 
agree with the law, there is no problem; 
when you resist and oppose, you are 
refusing to accord the law respect. Only 
when you disagree on an important 
matter are you given the opportunity to 
engage in the moral practice of respecting 
it. Such a moment is a stage in the 
development of an essential ingredient of 
civic character; it is a part of an educa- 
tion, not purely practical or intellectual 
or a matter of training but an education 
of the whole self. In this it would be 
recognizable by Plato and Aristotle, both 
of whom saw education as the develop- 
ment of the character through testing and 
the development of habit. A person who 
has been through the struggle the Court 
describes will know, as no one else really 
can, the importance of the rule of law 
itself; and having respected it against his 
own inclination, he will be in a position 
to insist that others respect it against 
theirs. 
On such a view of civic life in general, 
and of the activity of the Court as well, 
the Court is resisting many tendencies of 
our culture: the attitude stimulatecl by 
our consumer economy, and given 
theoretical standing by certain schools ol 
economics, that reduces all chdices to 
preferences and treats them all as equal; 
the comparable view in the political 
arena that democracy means the collec- 
tive preference of the majority, however 
uneducated or biased it may be; the way 
in which certain political candidates 
address the voting public by trylng to 
stimulate whatever feelings will move it 
to vote for them, often in impossibly 
simplistic language, and the view that the 
Court is really just another political 
agency, to be staffed by those who will 
carry out the president's political agenda, 
and that all its opinions are really just the 
rationalization of the exercise of power. 
The Joint Opinion resists all of those 
assumptions, seeing in the citizen a 
capacity for responsible tension and 
growth, and seeing in the process or law 
- especially in the work of the Court - 
a source of education for itself and the 
polity. It defines the life of the citizen as 
an ethical drama, and its own life as one, 
too, providing a basis on which one can 
find possibilities for meaning in our 
shared life that are worthy of humanity. 
So read, this opinion enhances the 
dignity of the Court and the nation alike. 
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